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Abstract
We test whether, in addition to economic conditions, IMF credit is influenced
by political factors. On the basis of a panel model for 128 countries over the
period 1972-1998, we find that debt service scaled to exports, international
reserve holdings scaled to imports and economic growth, as well as
investment are robustly related to IMF credit supply. Arguably, these results
are broadly consistent with the IMF’s mission. The only political variables
which appear to be related to changes in IMF credit are government stability,
the quality of the bureaucracy, and a dummy variable indicating the extent of
political opposition. Possible interpretations of these findings are discussed.
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At present 183 countries are members of the IMF and eligible to take out loans from
the Fund. Membership requires a contribution to the IMF (quota), which depends on
the size of the country’s economy. A member-country can draw up to 25% of its
quota; to draw more requires a special agreement with the Fund.
1 The IMF attaches
conditions to these loans, which, depending on the economic circumstances, may
include fiscal austerity, tight monetary policy, and currency devaluations (Przeworski
and Vreeland, 2000).
How does the IMF decide on its lending? Article I of the Articles of Agreement
of the IMF states that the activities of the Fund should, among other things, “facilitate
the expansion and balanced growth of international trade” and “promote exchange
stability”. In other words, one should expect IMF lending to be based on mainly
economic considerations. However, it would be hard to deny that—at least to some
extent—political-economic factors may also play a role in the Fund’s lending
decisions. In fact, some critics of the IMF suggest that political motives might be
paramount, although their criticisms are rather different. For instance, Bird and
Rowlands (2000) discuss studies which are particularly critical of the Fund,
expressing concerns about a lack of appropriate governance in some countries
requesting IMF support. Dreher and Vaubel (2000) find a correlation between the
characteristics of political regimes and the extent to which countries demand or
receive IMF credits. Some of these issues are also prominently discussed in the recent
literature on ‘country ownership’ of IMF and/or Worldbank supported credit
programs (Helleiner, 2000). 
The literature on the determinants of IMF credit suffers from a variety of
drawbacks. First, most authors do not carefully examine the sensitivity of their
findings. Thus it is hard to tell whether the variables reported to be significant are
really robustly related to IMF credit. Second, although some papers include (a limited
number of) political variables, most studies do not offer a systematic analysis of the
role that political factors may play.
2 
                                                
1 There are four main types of IMF agreements: the stand-by arrangement (SBA), the extended fund
facility (EFF), the structural adjustment facility (SAF), and the enhanced structural adjustment facility
(ESAF), which was replaced by the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRFG). The fundamental
objective of these programs does not differ. Although they are supposed to cover a limited number of
years, many countries signed consecutive agreements (Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000).
2 An exception is Rowlands (1995).3
The aim of this paper is to analyze to what extent various political variables that
have been suggested in the literature as influencing IMF decisions are empirically
robust determinants of the amount of net credit supplied by the IMF. We focus on
credit as this issue has received scant attention so far (an exception is Dreher and
Vaubel, 2000). Most of the literature has focused on binary choice models for IMF
involvement of crisis management. However, it is not only interesting to know the
circumstances that lead a country to seek IMF funds, but also to know the factors that
determine the amount of IMF credit disbursed. For this purpose, we estimate a panel
model for 128 countries over the period 1972-1998 relating the extension of IMF
credit to economic and political data. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a review of
previous studies, focusing on political factors that may influence IMF credit, and
introduces our political variables. Section 3 explains the modeling strategy and
describes the other variables employed, while Section 4 contains the empirical results.
The final section offers some concluding comments.
2. Political factors that may influence IMF credit
From the demand as well as the supply side, the literature has suggested that various
political factors may influence the IMF decision-making process. We will
systematically discuss factors that have been recently suggested in the literature and
the proxies that we apply in our empirical model.
3 Appendix A1 summarizes studies
that have been published since the beginning of the 1990s (for a review of the older
literature, see Bird (1995) and Knight and Santaella (1997)), while Appendix A2
describes all variables that we have used in our research in more detail and gives the
sources. Many of the variables can be interpreted both as determinants of
government’s demand for IMF credit and as criteria by which the IMF may judge the
creditworthiness of countries demanding credit. Most studies on IMF credit use
                                                
3 As we use a panel model with fixed time and individual effects, only variables that vary over time and
across countries are considered. Therefore, variables like LIBOR and the number of other countries in
which the Fund is involved—the latter being suggested by Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) as one of
the proxies for ‘sovereignty costs’—are not taken up.4
reduced-form models so that demand and supply factors cannot be disentangled.
4 For
our purpose (i.e. to examine whether political variables really matter for the amount of
IMF credit provided) this is no problem.
Not all countries that would be eligible to draw resources from the IMF would
decide to do so to the extent that they perceive some loss of discretion over their
choice of adjustment policy. Especially, as argued by Bird and Rowlands (2000),
governments that perceive a large gap between their preferred policies and those
expected in the context of IMF conditionality and that are strongly nationalistic are
the least likely to turn to the Fund. To take this into account in our tests, we include a
variable reflecting whether a government is very nationalistic (national). 
Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) suggest that governments are more likely to
enter an agreement early in their terms, hoping that any perceived stigma of signing
an agreement will be forgiven or forgotten before the next elections. In other words,
demand for IMF credit might be higher after election years. Przeworski and Vreeland
(2000) report evidence in support of this view. Dreher and Vaubel (2000) argue that
elections may lead governments to ask for IMF credit as a means to finance election
spending. While IMF resources are rarely allocated directly to the government and
various safeguards against the misuse of these resources are routinely incorporated
into IMF lending programs, the authors suggest that the availability of IMF credit
might indirectly help to finance election spending. Dreher and Vaubel (2000) find that
net credit supplied by the IMF is generally higher around election time. To test for the
effect of elections, we include two election dummy variables: one for election years
for the executive (elecex) and one for election years for the legislative (elecleg). As
previous studies argue that there should be an effect before and/or after the election,
we take the lag and the lead of the election dummies.
The possibility of blaming the IMF for the necessary adjustment policies may be
an incentive to resort to the Fund. By involving the Fund in the decision-making
process, national politicians may be able to shield themselves from the political fall-
out of unpopular policies (Vaubel, 1986). This may especially apply to a non-unitary
government, for which we include a dummy variable (non-unit). Likewise, countries
with more unstable and polarized political systems—proxied by seven variables: the
                                                
4 As far as we know, only four studies (Knight and Santaella, 1997, Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000 and
Vreeland, 1999, 2001) have tried to disentangle both factors, but the separation of demand and supply5
number of political assassinations (assas), and revolutions (revol), and guerilla
problems (gueril), presence of ethnic tensions (ethnic), the number of government
crises (crises)
5, purges (purges), and instability within the government (govchange)—
will have more difficulties to arrange a credible adjustment program and will,
therefore, have a higher incentive to turn to the Fund. In this way, they will obtain a
seal of approval for a political program and, thus, gain in credibility. On the other
hand, the IMF might be less willing to provide its seal of approval when there is less
than full political support of such a program. The issue whether international
organizations such as the IMF should or should not seek broad local support for the
policies they endorse or incorporate in lending conditions is at the heart of the debate
on ‘country ownership’ (see, for instance, Helleiner, 2001). In the end, the existence
and direction of the relationship between the above listed variables with the
disbursement of IMF resources is an empirical question.
In general, the decision to involve the IMF crucially depends on government’s
assessment of the political costs that may result from the adjustment policies. A high
level of social unrest (proxied by three variables: the number of demonstrations
(demon), strikes (strikes) and riots (riots)) prior to the disbursement of IMF funds to a
county might actually indicate a pronounced need for outside resources—no matter
what strings are attached—to help calm an ongoing economic and political crisis.
6
Another implication of this line of reasoning is that dictatorial regimes—proxied by
an executive index of competitiveness (excomp) and a dummy indicating whether
chief executive is a military (military)—will have a smaller incentive to request IMF
assistance as they can more easily withstand unpopular adjustment programs (Bird
and Rowlands, 2001 and Edwards and Santaella, 1993). On the other hand,
Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) argue that as dictatorships are less constrained by
public opinion and competitive elections, they may make easier negotiation partners
for the IMF, and are therefore more likely to get credit. Which, if any, argument
prevails is again an empirical question.
                                                                                                                                           
factors in these studies remains a rather difficult task that has drawn severe criticism (see Dreher and
Vaubel, 2000).
5 As government crises may also occur due to an IMF stabilization program, we take the lagged value
of crises to circumvent endogeneity.
6 All these variables enter with a one-period lag. This also helps to avoid the possible endogeneity
problem. Demonstrations, strikes, and riots may contemporaneously increase if the government has to
take unpopular measures as part of an IMF stabilization program.6
Government’s willingness to devalue may depend on the length of the term in
office of the government, as devaluation, which often is a necessary part of an
adjustment program, is frequently perceived as failure. The ability to blame a
predecessor for this will be a decreasing function of the length that the current
government has been in power (Bird and Rowlands, 2001). We proxy this by the
duration of the government (office) and the number of years that the party of the chief
executive has been in office (partyoffice).
Political interests of its principal shareholders may be seen to influence
decisions by the IMF. An 85 percent majority is required for the most important Fund
decisions. Since voting power is—broadly speaking—allocated on the basis of
economic size, the US (which controls 17.83 percent of the voting power in the IMF),
as well as small coalitions of industrialized countries hold veto power in the Fund’s
decision making (Thacker, 1999). These countries may favor Fund programs with
countries with which they have important economic relations—proxied by share of
imports and exports from/to US in GDP (tradeUS). Rowlands (1995) notes that the
Fund has been accused of being concerned excessively with interests of international
lenders, especially after the 1982 debt crisis. We therefore include a variable
reflecting expropriation risk (exprisk). 
Bird and Rowlands (2000) also suggest that the IMF could prefer lending in
general to countries that are more liberal—proxied by political rights (polright) and
civil liberties (civlib)—and those with good governance—proxied by corruption
indicator (corrupt), a rule of law indicator (rulelaw), an indicator for the risk of
repudiation of government contracts (repudiation), and an indicator for the quality of
the bureaucracy (burqual). The size of a country requesting support may also matter:
larger countries—proxied by (lagged) relative size (relsize)—may more easily get
support to the extent that the ‘systemic’ or ‘contagion’ risk of a balance of payments
problems in these countries is higher than in smaller countries.7
3. The model and the other data
In contrast to most previous research, we focus on the amount of credit provided by
the IMF. We have two reasons for this choice. First, as follows from the literature
review of the previous section, this issue has received scant attention so far. Second, it
is interesting not just to know the circumstances that lead a country to seek IMF
funds, but also to know the factors that determine the amount of IMF credit supplied.
Data on the amount of outstanding IMF credit is readily available (see the Appendix).
Our dependent variable (credit) is the increase in this stock, scaled by GDP. The stock
of IMF credit is a non-stationary variable. Thus we use increases in the stock of credit,
to ensure that repayments, which are probably determined by other factors than new
loans, do not affect our results. The focus on credit relative to a GDP measure allows
us to scale IMF credit by economic size of the recipient country, reducing the possible
heteroskedasticity in the data. Since the access to IMF is in part based on a country’s
quota—and thus on a country’s economic strength—, this seems to be in line with the
institutional set-up, too. 
We employ (variants) of the so-called Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) as
suggested by Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992) to examine which
explanatory variables are robustly related to our dependent variable. To the best of our
knowledge, this has never been done before in the literature on the determinants of
IMF credit, although there are some very good reasons to apply this methodology. 
The EBA has been widely used in the economic growth literature. The central
difficulty in this research—which also applies to the research topic of the present
paper—is that several different models may all seem reasonable given the data, but
yield different conclusions about the parameters of interest. Indeed, a glance at the
studies summarized in Appendix A1 illustrates this point. The results of these studies
sometimes differ substantially, while most authors do not offer a careful sensitivity
analysis to examine how robust their conclusions are. As pointed out by Temple
(2000), presenting only the results of the model preferred by the author can be
misleading. 
The EBA can be exemplified as follows. Equations of the following general
form are estimated:
Y= αM + βF + γZ + u  (1)8
where Y is the dependent variable; M is a vector of ‘standard’ explanatory variables; F
is the variable of interest; Z is a vector of up to three (here we follow Levine and Renelt,
1992) possible additional explanatory variables, which according to the literature may
be related to the dependent variable; and u is an error term. The extreme bounds test for
variable F says that if the lower extreme bound for β—i.e. the lowest value for β minus
two standard deviations—is negative, while the upper extreme bound for β—i.e. the
highest value for β plus two standard deviations—is positive, the variable F is not
robustly related to Y.
As argued by Temple (2000), it is rare in empirical research that we can say
with certainty that some model dominates all other possibilities in all dimensions. In
these circumstances, it makes sense to provide information about how sensitive the
findings are to alternative modeling choices. Extreme bounds analysis provides a
relatively simple means of doing exactly this. Still, the EBA has been criticized in the
literature. Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) argues that the test applied in the extreme bounds
analysis poses too rigid a threshold in most cases. If the distribution of β has some
positive and some negative support, then one is bound to find at least one regression for
which the estimated coefficient changes sign if enough regressions are run. We will
therefore not only report the extreme bounds, but also the percentage of the regressions
in which the coefficient of the variable F is significantly different from zero at the 5
percent level. Moreover, instead of analyzing just the extreme bounds of the estimates
of the coefficient of a particular variable, we follow Sala-i-Martin’s (1997b) suggestion
to analyze the entire distribution. We also report the unweighted parameter estimate of
β and its standard deviation, as well as the unweighted cumulative distribution function
(CDF).
7
Another objection to EBA is that the initial partition of variables in the M and
in the Z vector is likely to be rather arbitrary. Still, as pointed out by Temple (2000),
there is no reason why standard model selection procedures (such as testing down
from a general specification) cannot be used in advance to identify variables that seem
                                                
7  Sala-i-Martin (1997a) proposes using the (integrated) likelihood to construct a weighted CDF.
However, the varying number of observations in the regressions due to missing observations in some of
the variables poses a problem. Sturm and De Haan (2001) show that as a result this goodness of fit
measure may not be a good indicator of the probability that a model is the true model and the weights
constructed in this way are not equivariant for linear transformations in the dependent variable. Hence,9
to be particularly relevant. This is indeed what we have done. We started with 12
economic explanatory variables, which are all listed in Appendix A2. An extensive
analysis of the data based on a general to specific approach yielded the  variables that
we selected for our M vector. These are: debt service scaled to exports (debtserv),
international reserve holdings (corrected for the change in IMF credit) scaled to
imports (intreserv) and (lagged) real GDP growth (ggdp). A heavy debt burden
relative to exports increases countries’ need for external finance to service that debt.
Likewise, countries with relatively low levels of international reserves relative to
imports will be less able to meet balance of payments difficulties through reserve use
and hence will be more likely to request and receive IMF credit (Knight and Santaella,
1997). Also countries experiencing relatively weak growth in real GDP probably
demand more credit (Dreher and Vaubel, 2000 and Bird and Rowlands, 2000): To
capture this, we include the growth rate of real GDP. As there is a possible
endogeneity problem with this variable, it enters with a one-period lag.
We first examine how robust this basic model is. Next, we check whether all
other variables listed in Appendix A2 are robustly related to IMF credit. Apart from
the political variables which were already discussed in the previous section, we have
selected various economic variables which have been suggested in the literature as
summarized in Appendix A1. The following economic variables are considered:
•  log of 1+inflation (infl): Countries experiencing high inflation are more likely in
need of IMF credit. However, the willingness of the IMF to provide funds may be
lower in case of high inflation (Dreher and Vaubel, 2000). 
•  Percentage change of the nominal exchange rate (xrate): Countries faced with a
speculative attack are more likely to turn to the IMF for assistance (Knight and
Santaella, 1997).
•  government budget deficit/GDP (deficit): Governments with high budget deficits
are more likely to turn to the Fund (Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000). On the other
hand, the Fund is more likely to enter into an arrangement with a country when its
budget constraint is less binding (Vreeland, 1999). 
                                                                                                                                           
changing scales will result in rather different outcomes and conclusions. We therefore restrict our
attention to the unweighted version. 10
•  (lagged) income per capita (gdpcap): Low-income countries are more likely to
seek Fund assistance.
8 
•  current account balance/GDP (curacc): A country that has a balance of payments
need for financial resources will be more likely to demand IMF credit. 
•  external debt/GDP (debt): A high debt ratio may not only lead to more demand for
IMF credit, but also to more supply as a high debt ratio may give a country
bargaining leverage over the IMF because of its importance for global financial
stability (Strom, 1999). On the other hand, a high debt ratio may reduce the
creditworthiness of the country concerned.
•  monetary expansion (growth rate of M2; gM2): A high rate of monetary growth
may indicate more need for funds, but may also decrease the Fund’s willingness to
supply credit.
•  terms of trade (gtot): A worsening of a country’s terms of trade is likely to weaken
a country’s external position, thereby increasing the likelihood that it will need to
seek Fund assistance.
•  investment/GDP (inv): A low ratio of investment to GDP may indicate limited
access to international capital markets, thereby making it more likely that it
requests Fund assistance (Knight and Santaella, 1997).
Like with some of the political variables, causality may be in the other direction. For
instance, countries under an IMF program may pursue policies to reduce their
inflation rate as part of the stabilization program. In that case IMF credit leads to
lower inflation. To reduce possible simultaneity bias, all economic explanatory
variables are lagged one year. 
                                                
8 Knight and Santaella (1997) mention two reasons for this. First, poor countries have limited access to
private international capital markets. Second, they may need technical assistance to develop well-
functioning institutions. (Some critics of the IMF would perhaps interpret a significant effect of an
income variable as support for the claim that the IMF has become to much of an aid agency (Rowlands,
1995)).11
4. Results
As explained in the previous section, we start by identifying a basic economic model
using standard model selection procedures (general to specific). The exercise leads to
a specification with the following explanatory variables for disbursed IMF credits in
percent of GDP: debt service scaled to exports (debtserv), international reserve
holdings scaled to imports (intreserv) and lagged real GDP growth (ggdp). These
variables (or variables akin to these) are also present in most models of IMF lending
behavior in the literature, indicating that the basic model selected here comes close to
a consensus model (compare the summary in Table A1 in the appendix). The results
presented in Table 1 are based on a data set including annual data for 128 IMF
member countries over the period 1972 to 1998. The panel model estimated includes
country and time dummies, a specification that is supported by the test statistics given
in the lower panel of the table. The dependent variable measures positive changes in
the stock of outstanding IMF credit in percent of GDP.
9












Hausman test on random effects 14.70 **
LR test on individual effects 394.10 **
LR test on time effects 135.75 **
LR test on time and individual effects 501.80 **
Note: All variables have been corrected for time
specific and country effects. T-Statistics are in brackets
below coefficients. ** indicate significance at the 1
percent level, respectively.
                                                
9 The results are very robust with regard to alternative specifications of the dependent variable. We
comment on a number of robustness checks toward the end of this section.12
The results indicate a strong positive impact of a high current debt burden on the
magnitude of IMF credit received relative to GDP. This might indicate a demand
effect, i.e. that countries burdened with high debt service are more inclined to
approach the IMF for additional funds, but it could also be a proxy for a number of
other factors otherwise absent from the basic model. For instance, the service due on
the stock of a country’s debt will also reflect past and present real shocks and their
fiscal consequences. We will return to this interpretation below. A decrease in
available international reserves signals pressure on the value of a national currency on
the forex markets. Arguably, extending credit to member countries that experience
balance-of-balance problems is part of the traditional IMF mission. A possible
explanation of the negative correlation between IMF credit disbursement and real
growth is that: countries suffering a severe real shock are more likely to turn to the
IMF for help. However, real shocks might also lead to financial and exchange rate
crises (Allen and Gale, 2000), triggering IMF support for member countries. The
fiscal repercussions of these events might also be behind the impact of debtserv on
IMF credit. 
Table 2 shows that the results for the basic model are indeed very robust. All
three explanatory variables have an unweighted CDF of 1—satisfying the criterion
suggested by Sala-i-Martin—and are significant in all regressions underlying this
CDF. Hence, even according to the very stringent EBA all three variables qualify as
being robustly related to our dependent variable, the increase in IMF credits.
Furthermore, the variables show an unweighted β coefficient close to the point
estimates in Table 1.













debtserv  0.18  2.78 100.00 1.00  1.61 0.22
intreserv -1.02 -0.04 100.00 1.00 -0.51 0.11
ggdp(-1) -3.70 -0.18 100.00 1.00 -1.52 0.39
Note: Results are based on 703 regressions.13
Next we use the basic model to conduct a robustness analysis of a number of
other economic, as well as some political-economic, variables that have been
identified in the literature as having an influence on IMF lending practices. Table 3
presents the outcome of this exercise. If we follow Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) and
consider only variables with an unweighted CDF above 0.95 to be robustly related to
IMF credit, a first result stemming from Table 3 is that most of these variables are not
robustly related to IMF credit. The only economic variable with an unweighted CDF
above 0.95 is investment. It has the ‘correct’ sign. Note, however, that the evidence on
investment is rather mixed, as its coefficient is only significant in 63 percent of the
regressions. On the basis of the value for CDF, the exchange rate variable is a
borderline case.
10 However, even if one accepts it as a robust variable according to
Sala-i-Martin's criterion, it is only significant in 36 percent of the regressions. Also
note that both investment and the exchange rate variable are not considered to be
robustly related to IMF credit according to the EBA criterion. Interestingly, a third
economic variable, the terms of trade measure (gtot), while showing a significant (and
‘correctly’ signed) coefficient in 66 percent of the regressions, should according to the
CDF not be considered to be robustly related to IMF credit.
The discussion of the political-economic literature in Section 2 suggests that a
number of political variables could show a significant and robust influence on IMF
credit disbursement. However, the only political variables that appear to be robustly
related to IMF credit according to the CDF criterion are the number of years the chief
executive has been in office (office), the quality of the bureaucracy (burqual), and the
dummy variable indicating repressed political opposition within the ranks of the
regime or opposition (purges),. In terms of the percentage of regressions in which the
coefficients are significantly different from zero, the results for the first two political
variables are somewhat less impressive (respectively 60 and 47 percent) than the
economic variables in the basic model or bureaucratic quality. It is also important to
note that, according to the strict EBA, neither of the three variables should be
considered to be robustly related to IMF credit, as the upper and lower bound change
signs.
                                                
10 The unweighted CDF of the exchange rate variable (xrate(-1)) equals 0.945.14














infl(-1) -0.0054 0.0027 0.14 0.64 0.0002 0.0006
xrate(-1) -0.0594 0.2540 36.42 0.95 0.0558 0.0317
deficit(-1) -0.0238 0.0298 0.00 0.64 0.0028 0.0068
gdpcap(-1) -0.8848 0.6979 0.71 0.61 -0.0601 0.1586
curacc(-1) -0.0228 0.0095 10.95 0.83 -0.0044 0.0036
debt(-1) -0.0017 0.0040 29.45 0.80 0.0008 0.0005
gm2(-1) -0.0002 0.0002 0.00 0.72 0.0000 0.0000
gtot(-1) -0.0099 0.0074 66.15 0.74 -0.0021 0.0016
inv(-1) -0.0324 0.0151 63.44 0.95 -0.0099 0.0047
Political Variables:
national -0.4348 0.7649 0.00 0.72 0.1010 0.1536
elecex(-1) -0.2319 0.2359 0.00 0.59 0.0175 0.0723
elecex(+1) -0.1771 0.2544 0.00 0.73 0.0453 0.0715
eleceg(-1) -0.1296 0.2489 26.03 0.86 0.0731 0.0542
eleceg(+1) -0.1219 0.2140 0.71 0.79 0.0460 0.0541
non-unit -0.1882 0.2508 0.00 0.69 0.0339 0.0658
assas -0.0604 0.0735 0.00 0.69 0.0100 0.0189
revol -0.1416 0.3186 28.02 0.90 0.0799 0.0524
gueril -0.2629 0.1403 0.00 0.69 -0.0375 0.0700
ethnic -0.1287 0.1808 21.48 0.92 0.0597 0.0381
crises(-1) -0.3600 0.1241 28.88 0.79 -0.0729 0.0624
purges -0.1101 0.5160 60.17 0.98 0.1709 0.0845
govchange -0.2575 0.3714 0.00 0.60 0.0211 0.0793
demon(-1) -0.0409 0.0540 0.00 0.76 0.0105 0.0146
strikes(-1) -0.0731 0.1841 46.23 0.91 0.0621 0.0383
riots(-1) -0.0247 0.0656 0.00 0.88 0.0182 0.0152
excomp -0.5171 0.3969 3.13 0.63 -0.0269 0.0789
military -0.4096 0.2108 30.01 0.90 -0.1174 0.0777
office -0.0270 0.0058 46.80 0.95 -0.0082 0.0043
partyoffice -0.0199 0.0194 0.71 0.53 -0.0005 0.0044
tradeus -0.0139 0.0145 0.00 0.68 -0.0018 0.0038
exprisk -0.1354 0.0817 0.00 0.77 -0.0219 0.0278
polright -0.0885 0.0834 0.00 0.59 -0.0045 0.0211
civlib -0.1136 0.0955 0.00 0.56 -0.0042 0.0266
corrupt -0.1972 0.1588 0.00 0.76 -0.0347 0.0444
rulelaw -0.2061 0.1134 2.84 0.82 -0.0439 0.0407
repudiation -0.1065 0.0825 0.00 0.73 -0.0173 0.0252
burqual -0.3554 0.1781 91.47 0.97 -0.1199 0.0523
relsize(-1) -1.0762 0.6183 6.69 0.74 -0.2057 0.2256
Notes: Results are based on 666 models.15
The negative coefficient for office is in line with the argument put forward by
Bird and Rowlands (2001). The result lends some support to the view that new
governments could be more likely than old governments to seek IMF resources. The
robust positive relation of purges with IMF credit disbursement is somewhat more
difficult to interpret. A possible explanation is that there is an increase in credit flows
in the wake of political crises. The positive impact of (one-period-lagged) strikes—
with a CDF of still 0.91—on IMF credit points in a similar direction. Interestingly, the
findings in Table 3 also indicate a negative relationship between IMF credit and
burqual, which contrasts the view of Bird and Rowlands (2001). A conceivable
interpretation is that higher bureaucratic quality of government lowers the likelihood
of financial or economic crises and thus of a need for IMF credit.
11
To check the robustness of these results even further we have experimented
with different variants of the dependent variable and the base model. One variant
controls for the fact that drawings on the first 25 percent of countries’ quotas are free
of the conditionality that is attached to other IMF lending. In another specification we
have used the change (instead of only the positive change) in the outstanding stock of
IMF credits as dependent variable. In a third check we included the lagged dependent
variable in the base model. Finally, to correct for potential cyclical element introduced
in the dependent variable by scaling it by GDP, we scaled it by trend GDP, which we
have constructed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Our conclusions are not affected
by any of these changes to the model.
12 
5. Concluding comments
In this paper we have systematically analyzed which economic and political variables
affect credit supplied by the IMF. In contrast to most previous research we focus on
the amount of credit provided by the IMF. We have two reasons for this choice. First,
this issue has received scant attention so far. Second, it is interesting not just to know
                                                
11 Table 3 suggests that military, the presence of a military regime, could have a negative influence on
IMF credit, indicating perhaps smaller demand for IMF support by non-democratic regimes as
suggested e.g. by Edwards and Santella (1993). The CDF is 0.90. Note, however, that only some
30 percent of regressions produce a significant coefficient and that the variable is disqualified by EBA.16
the circumstances that lead a country to seek IMF funds, but also to know the factors
that determine the amount of IMF credit supplied. On the basis of a panel model for
128 countries over the period 1972-1998, we find that debt service scaled to exports,
international reserve holdings scaled to imports, (lagged) economic growth, and
investment are robustly related to IMF credit supply. The only political variables
which appear to be robustly related to IMF credit supply are a dummy variable
indicating the repression of political opposition within the ranks of the regime or
opposition, the number of years the chief executive has been in office, and the quality
of the bureaucracy. While these findings give some support to the notion that
political-economic variables may play a (limited) role in the flow of IMF credit, they
also suggest that more theoretical groundwork on the determinants of the demand and
supply of IMF resources might be helpful to guide future econometric research. This
is also true for a more disaggregated analysis of IMF credit flows by credit facilities
or country groups.
                                                                                                                                           
12 All additional results are available on request.17
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Appendix A1: Summary of studies since 1990
Study: Type of model: Economic Variables included: Effect: Political Variables included: Effect:
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Change in real exchange rate
Change in current account deficit





political strikes, riots, demonstrations
political assassinations, attacks, deaths














Contractual date of expiration of IMF program
Growth rate GNP
Current account/GNP
World real interest rate
Terms of trade
International debt









No political variables included




Per capita GDP relative to US
Population
Dummy for eligible for SAF/ESAF
Debt service/exports (official and private)
Debt (official and private)




(Growth rate of) GDP
LIBOR

















Concessional loans (soc. orientation)
US assistance
Industrial country’s export 
Share in world imports
Voting power in IMF
Regional dummies



















No political variables included20
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(change in) balance of payment
(change in) current account
(change in) debt/GNP
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US direct investment in a country
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Study: Type of model: Economic Variables included: Effect: Political Variables included: Effect:
Balance of payments/GDP (in model for IMF
willingness to start program)
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Vreeland (2001) Probit model for
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type of democratic executive-legislative 
+
+22







Balance of payments/GDP interacted with Size (in







number of other countries under IMF
program (in model for IMF willingness to
start program)
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Square of GDP per capita
Foreign reserves/imports







share of IMF quotas
country's nationals among IMF staff




a) The results for the bivariate probit model are shown.
b) The results for the determinants of entering an IMF program are shown.23
Appendix A2. List of variables and their sources
Variable: Sign: Description: Source:
IncrCredIMF positive change in use of IMF credit (DOD, current
US$) (% of GDP)
World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
Debtserv (+) total debt service (% of exports of goods and
services) 
World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
Intreserv (-) (gross international reserves (includes gold, current
US$) - change in use of IMF credit (DOD, current
US$)) / imports of goods and services (current
US$)
World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
Xrate (+) growth rate of official exchange rate (LCU per
US$, period average)
World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
Infl (?) log (1+inflation (consumer prices)) World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
Ggdp (-) growth of real GDP  World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
Deficit (?) overall budget deficit, including grants (% of GDP)  World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
Gdpcap (-) log (GDP at market prices (constant 1995 US$) /
population)
World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
Curacc (-) current account balance (% of GDP)  World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
Debt (?) external debt, total (DOD, current US$) / GDP at
market prices (current US$)
World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
Gm2 (?) money and quasi money growth (annual %) World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
Gtot (-) growth rate of terms of trade World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
Inv (-) gross domestic fixed investment (% of GDP)  World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
National (-) dummy for nationalistic governments World Bank database of
political institutions, version 2
Elecex (+) dummy for executive election-years World Bank database of
political institutions, version 2
Eleceg (+) dummy for legislative election-years World Bank database of
political institutions, version 2
Non-unit (+) dummy for non-unitary governments (Index of
Political Cohesion >= 1)
World Bank database of
political institutions, version 2
Assas (+) number of politically motivated murders or
attempted murders of high government officials or
politicians
Banks' International Archive
Revol (+) number of revolutions (illegal or forced changes in
the top governmental elite, attempts at such
changes, or (un)successful armed rebellions)
Banks' International Archive
Gueril (+) guerilla warfare: any armed activity, sabotage, or
bombings aimed at the overthrow of the present
regime
Banks' International Archive
Ethnic (+) presence of ethnic tensions International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG) Data
Crises (+) number of major government crises that threaten to
bring the downfall of the present regime
Banks' International Archive
Purges (+) number of systematic repressions (or eliminations)
by jailing or execution of political opposition
within the ranks of the regime or the opposition
Banks' International Archive24
Variable: Sign: Description: Source:
Govchange (+) percentage of veto players who drop from the
government
World Bank database of
political institutions, version 2
Demon (+) number of peaceful anti-government
demonstrations
Banks' International Archive
Strikes (+) number of strikes (1,000 or more workers) aimed at
national government policies or authority
Banks' International Archive
Riots (+) number of violent demonstrations or clashes of
more than 100 citizens
Banks' International Archive
Excomp (?) measure of dictatorship (executive index of
electoral competitiveness <= 2)
World Bank database of
political institutions, version 2
Military (?) dummy if chief executive is a military officer World Bank database of
political institutions, version 2
Office (-) number of years the chief executive has been in
office
World Bank database of
political institutions, version 2
Partyoffice (-) number of year party of chief executive has been in
office
World Bank database of
political institutions, version 2
Tradeus (+) trade relations with US (export to and import from
US / GDP)
OECD ICTS database, World
Bank 2000 CD-Rom
Exprisk (+) expropriation risk  International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG) Data
Polright (+) political rights index Freedom House
Civlib (+) civil liberties index Freedom House
Corrupt (-) indicator for corruption in government International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG) Data
Rulelaw (+) rule of law (law and order tradition) indicator International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG) Data




Burqual (+) indicator for bureaucratic quality International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG) Data
Relsize (+) Relative size of country (GDP / World GDP) World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
Note: The expected sign is shown in parentheses. See main text for further explanation.